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COMMENTS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES IN LABOR CONTROVERSIES
There is a constantly growing tendency in our courts to regard most
rights and privileges in the law of torts as not absolute, but relative or
conditional in the sense that their existence is dependent upon the
surrounding circumstances. This is particularly true in the field of
labor litigation involving controversies between employers and working-
men. A recognition of this element of "relativity" is helpful in reach-
ing the. proper solution of the difficult problems of this character that
frequently come before our courts. Equally helpful is a careful discri-
mination between the term "right" in its restricted sense (what another
must, in the eye of the law, do or refrain from doing) and the term
"privilege" (what one, in the eye of the law, may do or forbear to do).
It is a matter for regret, therefore, to find an influential court expressing
the view that the "rights" involved in labor controversies are absolute
and in no real sense interrelated, and failing to distinguish between the
true right and privilege.
Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n. (1922) 305 Ill. 331, 137
N. E. 222 (two cases) grew out of a contest between a carpenters'
union and a contractors' association. The contractors' association, in
order to make effective a lockout declared against union carpenters by
way of retaliation for a strike called by the union carpenters in viola-
tion of a trade agreement, "requested" the dealers in building material
to cease selling and delivering materials to all persons employing union
carpenters or other union labor in the building trade. Since the
contractors' association represented about So per cent. of the business
of the material dealers, this "request" (as was to be expected) was
complied with. In consequence, one Hill, an employer of union labor
but not himself a member of the contractors' association, was unable
to obtain building material and was therefore forced to discharge A
(the plaintiff in the first case). For the same reason B (the plaintiff
in the second case), who was neither a carpenter nor a carpenter con-
tractor, but who was engaged in erecting a building for himself, employ-
ing union carpenters, was not able to complete his building. The Illinois
Supreme Court, in affirming judgments for A and B against the Con-
tractors' Association, held that A "has a right under the law as between
himself and others to full freedom in disposing of his own labor accord-
ing to his own will," and that B "had the right, under the law, to full
freedom in investing his capital in the building which he was erecting
and in employing any person free to accept employment from him, at a
wage and under conditions agreeable to him. He had the right to a free
and open market in which to purchase materials with which to complete
his building. These rights being clear, any one who invades them
without lawful cause or justification commits a legal wrong, and, the
wrong being followed by an injury in consequence thereof, plaintiffs
have a right of action for such wrong." There is no occasion to quarrel
with the conclusion here reached, although the precise question involved
31
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was not decided or discussed in any of the cases cited by the court.
Nor, aside from the failure to distinguish clearly between right in its
narrow sense and "right" in the sense of privilege, is the language just
quoted open to objection. In an earlier part of the opinion, however,
the court expresses itself as follows:
"Much of the defendants' brief is devoted to a discussion of their
rights and to the contention that in self-defense they were legally justi-
fied in doing what they did. Defendants' rights are not in any respect
involved in this litigation, and need not be considered, except when
necessary to a determination of plaintiffs' rights. The apparent confu-
sion that exists in the law as declared in adjudicated cases in the differ-
ent .jurisdictions is due largely to a faulty mode of approach. When-
ever a court permits itself to be led afield into a discussion of the rights
of the defendant in tort actions and to become entangled in the subtleties
connected with the phrases 'primary purpose' and 'legal justification,'
it is apt to have its attention diverted from a consideration of the ques-
tion whether plaintiff's rights have been invaded by the doing of the
act charged. To discuss the rights of the defendant is to confuse rather
than clarify the issue. To argue that defendant had a legal right to do
what it did, and that plaintiff cannot complain of the damage incidentally
following the exercise of defendant's rights, is to approach the question
from the rear. Where A by close attention to business, by aggressive
business methods, and by offering better values takes customers from B,
and thereby damages B's business, B is not entitled to recover from A
for the reason that he had no legal right to have a monopoly on the busi-
ness in the territory, and not for the reason that A had a right to enter
the field. If A digs a well on his farm and thereby destroys a well on
B's farm by intercepting the source of water, B cannot recover from A
because he had no legal right to a continuance of the exclusive use of the
source of water, and not because A had the right to dig his well. The
court should first determine whether plaintiff has a legal right which it
is the duty of defendant to respect, and then proceed from that point to
determine the controversy. We shall therefore approach the considera-
tion of this case from the standpoint of the plaintiffs."
As appears from the quotation first made, the court later on said that
any one who harms the plaintiffs by an invasion of their rights "without
lawful cause or justification" is answerable in damages. Concededly
then, lawful cause or justification might in a proper case be shown, and
if shown would destroy or disprove the existence of a plaintiff's right.
It is respectfully submitted that a discussion at the outset of the
"rights" [privileges] of the defendant in these two cases is essential
to a clear appreciation and sound solution of the issues, involved. It is
submitted further that the only satisfactory method of dealing with the
complex problems that here arise is to start with the oft-stated proposi-
tion that the voluntary doer of an act which causes legally recognized
harm to another must be held answerable therefor unless his conduct
COMMENTS
can for some acceptable reason be justified or excused, or, in other
words, is shown to be privileged. As Justice Holmes tersely puts it:
"prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of
action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form
of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape."'-
It may be confidently asserted that there are today but few rights and
privileges in the law of torts which are under all circumstances absolute,
although many connected with the ownership and enjoyment of real
estate are nearly so. Yet even in the case of land in many states if a
man digs a well with the sole motive of causing his neighbor's well to go
dry,2 or if he needlessly wastes underground water to his neighbor's
damage,3 he has exceeded his privilege; so also if he establishes a rival
business solely to injure the plaintiff,4 or erects a spite fence (usually a
statutory restriction of privilege) . Our whole law of nuisance is a
restriction of the landowner's privileges. Again it is the duty of a
railroad company in many states to use care to guard its turntables for
the benefit of infant invaders who are too young to realize the danger.
6
Thus the privileges of a landowner to use his land as he sees fit are not
absolute. Nor indeed has he absolute rights that others shall not invade
his land. Even a voluntary trespass to real estate may be privileged,
as when it is to save life or property,7 or when made by a sheriff or
policeman or fireman in discharge of his public duty."
Much more restricted and qualified are those rights and privileges
which are involved in a labor controversy. Just as a battery may be
justified by circumstances and therefore legally privileged, as for
example when done in self-defense, so in the instant case it is con-
ceivable that some circumstances would justify an interference with the
'Aikeas v. Wisconsin (19o4) 195 U. S. 194, ?04, 25 Sup. Ct. 3, 5. And see
(1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 194.
2Stevens v. Kelley (1886) 78 Me. 445, 452; contra: Bradford v. Pickles [1895,
H. L.] A. C. 587.
'Barclay v. Abraham (19o3) 121 Iowa, 61g, 96 N. W. io8o. The cases on
underground water are collected in a note in 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 465.
'Tuttle v. Buck (igog) iO7 Minn. 145, 11g N. W. 946.
'The cases are collected in 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 831, note, and 52 L. R. A. (N. s.)
736, note.
"Most of the rights of property, as well of person, in the social state, are not
absolute but relative, and they must be so arranged and modified, not unnecessarily
infringing upon natural rights, as upon the whole to promote the general welfare."
Earl, C., in Losee v. Buchawn (1873) 51 N. Y. 476, at p. 485.
'Sioux City Ry. v. Stout (1874, U. S.) 17 Wall. 658. See Smith, Liability of
Landowners to Children Entering without Permission (1898) Ir HARv. L. REv.
349, 434; Townes, Liability Arising from Dangerous Premises (1922) I TEX. L.
REv. i; Hudson, The Turntable Cases in. the Federal Courts (1923) 36 HARv. L.
REv. 826.
"Ploof v. Putnam (19o8) 8, Vt 471, 71 Atl. 188; Proctor v. Adams (1873)
113 Mass. 376.
" Winslow v. Gifford (185o, Mass.) 6 Cush. 327. See also American Print
Works v. Lawrence (1848) 21 N. J. L. 248; Hale v. Lawrence (1848) 21 N. J. L.
714.
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continued employment of the plaintiff or with his purchase of building
materials.9 It is true that plaintiff A has the legal privilege as against
the defendant of selling his services to any willing employer; and plain-
tiff B has the like privilege as against the defendant of buying materials
of any willing dealer. It is true also that accompanying these privileges
the plaintiffs generally have a legal right that the defendant shall not
induce third parties to refuse to buy the service or to sell the materials.
Such right does not necessarily accompany the privilege, however, and
it does not accompany it where circumstances exist that on grounds of
public welfare are held to justify interference by the defendant. Such
justifying circumstances extinguish the defendant's duty to the plaintiff
and create the privilege of interference. The legal rights of the plain-
tiffs against the defendant end exactly where the legal privileges of the
defendant begin, and the boundary line between them can be determined
only by considering fully the interests of both parties and of the public.
Thus, had plaintiff A been a non-union carpenter, with whom union
carpenters refused to work, their refusal might cause the plaintiff to be
without a job, and yet in many states such interference would be legally
privileged on their part. So too, a refusal to work with A would doubt-
less everywhere be privileged if A was reasonably believed to be so care-
less as to endanger life or limb of his fellow workers. Similar justifi-
cations-privileges-may also be found for interference with B's
"right" [privilege] to employ freely whom he will and his "right"
[privilege] to purchase materials of whom he will and his rights that
others shall not molest him in the exercise of such privileges.
Just where in a given situation one man's right ceases and another
man's privilege begins is to be determined by the nores of the time and
place, as expounded by the courts and by legislation. In former times
a strike was held to be an unprivileged invasion of the employer's right
to a free labor market. Of course many strikes are now lawful. Today
in many of our states, a secondary boycott is held to be an unprivileged
interference with a free market for labor or goods; though some courts
have held such to be a privileged interference with a free market for
goods and the same has occasionally been held a privileged interference
with a free market for labor. In England the Trades Disputes Act,
19o6,10 has greatly limited the rights and extended the privileges of the
parties to a trade dispute, as compared with those that prevailed there
under the rules of the common law. A notable limitation by prohibiting
all resort to injunctive relief in labor disputes was attempted in the
Arizona statute recently held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Truax v. Corrigan.'1
For citations of authorities on these matters see the series of COMMENTS on
Labor Litigation in (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280, 404, 501, 736.
106 Edw. VII, c. 47. The English courts have displayed a tendency to construe
the act rather narrowly; see Posner, Englisht Trade Disputes Act of 19o6 (1922)
io CALiF. L. REv. 395.
" (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124.
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Thus, in order to clear the ground and to give full scope for the
determination of the true rule upon a proper consideration of the con-
flicting issues of policy involved in any labor controversy, it seems
desirable and indeed essential that the matter be considered in the light
of the contending interests of the parties concerned. In a complex
case, where the court has before it the question whether a plaintiff's
legal right has been invaded, it is submitted that a satisfactory
answer can be given only after stating the situation in the form
of the prima facie right of the plaintiff which appears to
have been invaded, and after paying due regard to the counter interests
of the defendant, and determining whether they justify the defendant's
action and thus nullify the plaintiff's prima facie right. Such a form
of statement will enable the court to see the issue clearly and to deter-
mine if such counter interests create a true privilege justifying the inflic-
tion of the harm suffered by the plaintiff.' 2
E. S. T.
ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS
When the Supreme Court of Michigan in Stockdale v. Yerden'
quoted with approval' the statement that "The great weight of the
authorities supports the doctrine that easements in gross, properly so
called because of their personal character, are not assignable or inherit-
able, nor can they be made so by any terms in the grant," it undoubtedly
spoke the language of a great majority of the courts which have taken
occasion to discuss these peculiar interests. The term "easement" is
2 Such an analysis of the situation in the first of the two cases discussed might
be made as follows: A has the privilege of disposing of his own labor according
to his own will; he has the prima facie right that others shall not molest him
(save perhaps by peaceable persuasion) in the exercise of such privilege. Defen-
dants, the Contractors' Association, have intentionally interfered with A's privi-
lege, by their acts of bringing economic pressure to bear on dealers in building
material, thereby inducing the latter to refuse to sell goods to A's employer, who
was thus unable to obtain building material and so discharged A. Defendants
seek to justify the harm so caused to A by saying that it was done to render effec-
tive a lockout of union carpenters declared because the members of the carpenters'
union struck for higher wages in violation of their trade agreement with defen-
dants. The issue is thus narrowed down to this: In such a trade dispute between
a carpenters' union and an employers' association, is it sound policy to permit one
of the disputants to force third parties (in this case dealers in building materials)
by covert threat of withdrawal of custom to take sides and to refuse to sell
materials to a fourth party (a contractor who is not a member of the said contrac-
tors' association) for the purpose of forcing such contractor to discharge a member
of the carpenters' union? It is believed that the court reached a sound conclu-
sion when it decided that the Carpenters' Association was not excused [privileged]
with respect to the harm so caused to A.
' (1922, Mich.) i9o N. W. 225.
'From 9 R. C. L. 739.
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used to describe that interest which exists when there is granted or
reserved to one person the privilege of using in some way land in the
possession of another, together with the right that no one shall inter-
fere with such user.3  If the parties intend that the easement is to be
enjoyed by the grantee only in his capacity as owner or occupant of
another tract of land, not necessarily contiguous,4 such easement is said
to be annexed to the land,5 and is called an easement appurtenant. But
if the easement passes to the grantee merely as a person, without refer-
ence to any dominant tenement, it is called an easement in gross. It
is manifest that in the case of the easement appurtenant, the dominant
tenement not only determines the devolution of the easement, which
passes to successive assignees and occupants of the land, but also
narrowly limits its enjoyment to the uses of the dominant land. It is
equally clear that the easement in gross, not being related in its enjoy-
ment to any dominant tenement, is without limit save in the terms of the
grant creating it.
These curious interests in land, here denominated easements in gross,
have known a highly interesting career in the courts, and afford an
excellent illustration of the extent to which words can disguise and even
distort ideas. In England a standard text-writer feels justified in
saying, "It is clearly established now that there is no such right known
to the law as an easement in gross."6  In Hill v. Tupper the court very
readily disposed of an attempt to create an easement in gross on the
authority supplied by Lord Brougham's fantastic dictum in Keppell v.
Bailey,8 denying that "incidents of a novel kind can be devised and
attached to property'at the fancy or caprice of any owner." Where-
fore the court held that the claimant of an easement in gross took no
interest in the land but merely a contract right enforceable against his
covenantor. But conditions have been too hard for this simple view.
The courts have been compelled to recognize the existence of such
'Hohfeld, Faulty Anilysls in Ea4seent and License Cases (1917) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 66, 7,; Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1198.
'Graham v. Walker (,9o5) 78 Conn. 13o, 61 Ati. 98.
'The phrase "annexed to the land" so commonly used in the law of easements
is misleading, as it implies that in some way the easement is a part of the land, and
passes with it. Of course it is but a figure of speech to express the idea that
ownership of the aggregate of legal relations with respect to the land of another
which we call an easement, is associated by the law with ownership of that much
larger sum of such relations with respect to another tract of land which we call
the dominant tenement.
' Goddard, Easements (8th ed. 1921) 30. See also the statement of Lord Cairns
in Rangeley v. Midland Ry. (1868) L. R. 3 Ch. 306, 33o.
(1863, Exch.) 2 Hurl. & C. 121.
8 (1834, Ch.) 2 Myl. & K. 517, 535. The weight of this statement is not
greatly increased by the reason given by that eccentric genius. "It is clearly
inconvenient to the science of the law and to the public weal that such a latitude
should be given." What would his Lordship have thought of an easement to main-
tain a signboard? See Moody.v. Steggles (1879) L. R 32 Ch. Div. 261.
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interests in land as highways,9 rights to maintain pipe lines 10 and
sewers,1 ' to occupy pews1 2 in churches, and the like, all enjoyed without
reference to any dominant tenement. Some incautious judges have
referred to them as easements, 3 but the more careful have called them
"rights in gross analogous to easements,' 4 and, by sheer definition,
have confined the meaning of "easement" to rights annexed to a domi-
nant estate. Thus we find that the English law has given to easements
in gross a local habitation, but denied them a name. This seems the
more churlish when we note the hospitality shown to profits in gross, 5
for a profit is merely an easement with the addition of the privilege of
severing some part of. the servient land and the power thereby to acquire
title to the thing severed.'6
With such a background, it might be expected that on this side of the
water the easement in gross would receive eccentric treatment. Here,
too, there is some authority denying to a way in gross the name of ease-
ment and even the quality of an interest in land,'7 and fully accepting the
English view that it is essentially different from its near relative, the
profit in gross.'" But most of the American courts have been willing
to accord this foundling the name of easement in gross, and to regard
it as an interest in land to be protected as such,' 9 but yet an interest so
"personal" in its character as to be neither assignable nor inheritable,
even though the right is expressly given to the grantee, his heirs and
9 Dovastan v. Pa yie (1795, C. P.) 2 H. BI. 527.
" Waterworks Co. v. Bowlen (1851) 17 Q. B. 358.
"Soinersetshire v. Bridgwater [1899, H. L.] 81 L. T. 729.
See Proud v. Price (1893) 62 L. J. Q. B. 490.
13 Heath, J., in Dovasto.x v. Pa3ye, supra note 9; Sentouse v. Christian (1787)
i Durn. & East, 560; Mounsey v. Ismay (1865) 1 Hurl. & C. 729. See also Gale,
Easements (9th ed. 1916) II, 12.
"Rangeley v. Midland Ry., sapra note 6; Vestry of St. Mary v. Jacobs (1871)
L. R. 7 Q. B. 47; Goddard, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 6.
" See Gale, Easements, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 195; Mountjoy's Case (1583,
C. P.) Coke, Littleton, *164 b; Welcome v. Upton (184o, Exch.) 6 M. & W. 536.
"Hohfeld, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 70; Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 1388.
"A mere naked right to pass and repass over the land of another .... is not
in any sense an interest or estate in the land itself." Boatman v. Lasley (1873)
23 Ohio St. 614. See also Houston v. Zal n (19o4) 44 Or. 6IO, 76 Pac. 641.
"Post v. Pearsall (1839, N. Y.) 22 Wend. 425; Cadwalader v. Bailey (i8i)
17 R. I. 495, 23 At. 20. In Saratoga State Waters Corporation v. Pratt (1920)
227 N. Y. 429, 125 N. E. 834, the court felt itself so much embarrassed by the
supposed rule that an easement in gross is non-assignable, that it intimated its
willingness to hold a right in gross to take water from the land of another to be a
profit A prendre if necessary in order to protect it from confiscation in the hands of
an assignee. It was held, however, that what looked very much like an assignment
was really not one. See (192o) 29 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 696. To the same effect
is Clement v. Ratland Country Club (1920) 94 Vt. 63, io8 Atl. 843. See (1920)
30 YALE LA JouRNAL, 99.
" See Cusack v. Myers (1920) 189 Iowa, 190, 178 N. W. 401; Saratoga
State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, supra note 8.
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assigns.2 0 , In fact the language of the cases fully supports the broad
statement above quoted, although there are surprisingly few of the
cases in which such language was necessary for the determination of the
issues raised.
2 1
But upon a broader view of modern usage this seems a most astound-
ing statement. In most instances the "right of way" of a railroad is
but an easement in gross. 22  Yet it has never been even suggested that
such a right is not assignable. The same thing may-be said of rights
of way for telegraph and telephone lines, 23 for sewers24 and pipe-lines. 23
Water rights, or easements for the diversion of water, in this country
are constantly granted in gross; and if intended to be assiguable and
inheritable, are freely so regarded by the courts. 26  Grants of bill
posting or display advertising rights upon the land or buildings of the
grantor are easements in gross.2 1 Can any one doubt that such a right
is assignable, or that it could be made inheritable if so intended by the
parties? Furthermore there is to be found a respectable number of
decisions 28 by highly respectable courts seemingly in flat conflict with the
"Boatinan v. Lasley, supra note 17; Fisher v. Fair (189o) 34 S. C. 203, 13
S. E. 470; Alley v. Carleton (1867) 29 Tex. 74; Jones, Easenzeits (898) sec.
422; Washburn, Easements (4th ed. 1885) 11; Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 3,
2226; (292o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 218, Comment on Mathews Slate Co. v.
Advance Industrial Supply Co. (1918) 185 App. Div. 74, 172 N. Y. Supp. 830.
' See the cases collected in i C. J. 867, and 9 R. C. L. 729.
'Radetsky v. Jorgensen (1922, Calif.) 202 Pac. 175; Query v. Postal Telegraph,
Cable Co. (1919) 178 N. C. 639, 101 S. E. 3go; Re Anthonyt Avenw (905) 46
Misc. 525, 95 N. Y. Supp. 77. A railway company may acquire an absolute title
to the strip of land on which its rails are laid, but there is a strong presumption
that only an easement was intended to pass. A. B. & A. Ry. v. Coffey County
(922) 152 Ga. 432, i2O S. E. 214.
'Query v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Company, supra note 22; Eels v. American
Telegraph & Telephone Co. (894) 143 N. Y. 133, 38 N. E. 202. See the cases
set out in the note in 8 A. L. R 1293-1311.
'
4 Aldennan v. New Haven (29o8) 81 Conn. 137, 7o Atl. 626.
Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi (I9O7) 72 N. J. Eq. 492, 66 Atl. 427.
"Walker v. Lillingston (19o2) 137 Calif. 4o2, 70 Pac. 282; Patterson v.
Chamzber's Power Co. (x916) 81 Or. 328, 159 Pac. 568; Lawrence v. Whitney
(889) 115 N. Y. 410, 22 N. E. 174; Lawrie v. Silsby (1904) 76 Vt. 240, 56 Atl.
1io6.
Willoughby v. Lawrence (1886) 116 Ill. 11, 4 N. E. 356; Cusack v. Myers,
supra note i; Levy v. Louisville Gunning System (905) 12 Ky. 5,1, 89 S. W.
528. Quite consistently with Hill v. Tup per, supra note 7, the English House of
Lords has held that a contract for display advertising space on the wall of a
building created no interest in the land which a subsequent lessee of the premises
must respect King v. Allen a d Sons [1916, H. L.] 2 A. C. 54. Here, however,
the parties to the contract 'clearly contemplated only a license.
Goodrich v. Burbank (1866, Mass.) 12 Allen, 459; French v. Morris (1869)
aoI Mass. 68; Amidon v. Harris (1873) 113 Mass. 59; Standard Oil Co. v.
Buchi, supra note 25; Cross -a. Berlin Mills Co. (1918) 79 N. H. 116, 205 Atl.
411; Fowler v. Kent (902) 71 N. H. 388, 52 Atl. 5$4; Ring v. Walker (1895)
87 Me. 550, 33 Atl. 174; Percival v. Williains (9o9) 82 Vt. 531, 74 Atl. 321;
Clement v. Ructland Country Club, supra note 18; Pinku'm v. Ea Claire (1892)
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general rule as stated above. Evidently there is something strangely
wrong with the alleged rule. The assertion of the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire-29 that "At the present time, however it may have been
anciently, it is difficult to assign a practical or convincing reason for
such a proposition," carries conviction.
It is believed that the key to this puzzle is to be found in the law relat-
ing to profits, which are only expanded easements. The owner of a
profit is not allowed to deal with it in such a way as to surcharge the
servient tenement.30 A profit was apportionable upon partition of the
dominant tenement provided it was admeasurable, that is self-limiting,
as a common of pasturage for beasts levant and couchant upon the domi-
nant land.3 1 But if the profit was not adnieasurable, as in the case of
common of estovers, the partition of the dominant tenement extin-
guished the profit.32 So did a release of part of the servient tenement,
for otherwise the remainder of the servient tenement would be sur-
charged.3 3 For the same reason a common appurtenant for beasts
levant and couchant could not be assigned in gross, while a common of
pasturage for a certain number of beasts could be so assigned.3 4 A
several, or exclusive, profit in gross can be freely assigned or appor-
tioned, for no surcharge can result ;35 but a profit in common must be
assigned singly and not apportioned, as otherwise the servient estate
would be -surcharged.8
Throughout these cases is to be observed the solicitude of the courts
to protect the servient land from surcharge through assignment of
profits not admeasurable. The same care to guard against surcharge
of burdened estates by the assignment of easements not admeasurable
is apparent in the cases. All easements appurtenant are admeasurable,
for they are limited to the uses of the dominant land, and therefore there
can be no surcharge through assignment with the land. But not so in
case of those easements in gross which are not admeasurable, of which
the ordinary private way is the most familiar example. -Contrast the
two leading cases announcing the supposedly conflicting rules as to the
81 Wis. 301, 51 N. W. 550; Poidl v. Mockley (1873) 33 Wis! 482. See also
Mayor of New York v. Law (18gi) 125 N. Y. 380, 26 N. E. 471 (right to main-
tain a wharf).
, Cross V. Berlin Mills Co., supra note 28.
" Tyrringham's Case (1584, Q. B.) 4 Co. 36 b; Rotherham v. Green (1597, C.
P.) Cro. Eliz. 593.
" Tyrringham's Case, supra note 30; Hall v. Lawrence (1852) 2 R. I. 218.
" Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff (1833, N. Y.) Io Wend. 639; Hall v. Lawrence,
supra note 31; Grubb v. Bayard (1851, C. C. E. D. Pa.) Fed. Cas. No. 5849.
' Tyrrnghain's Case, supra note 30.
" Druryv. Kent (16o3, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 14. See also Phillips v. Rhodes (1843,
Mass.) 7 Metc. 322.
'New Haven v. Hotchkiss (1904) 77 Conn. 168, 58 At. 753; Baker v. Kenney,
145 Iowa, 638, 124 N. W. 9O1.
='Grubb v. Bayard, snpra note 32; Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Co. (1877)
36 Mich. lO5; Mountioy's Case, supra note 15.
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assignability of easements in gross. In Boatman v. Lasley,3 7 a right of
way over certain land was granted to one L, his heirs and assigns.
Here there is nothing to measure or limit the extent of the user of this
way if it is allowed to pass to L's heirs, who may be numerous, or his
assigns, who might readilr be multitudinous. The court was entirely
right in refusing to permit the surcharge of the servient estate.
On the other hand, in Goodrich v. Burbank3 s a grantor reserved in
gross to himself, his heirs and assigns the right to lay and maintain upon
the land granted an inch and a quarter pipe to a spring on the same
land, and to take therefrom so much water as would pass through that
pipe. Here the easement was strictly admeasurable. Whether assigned
to one or a thousand there was no possibility ,of a surcharge. The
parties intended to create an assignable and inheritable interest in the
land granted, and there was no reason whatever, in public policy or
Lord Brougham's "science of the law," why their intention should
not be given effect. The decision of the court holding the easement
assignable was inevitably correct, and conflicted with Boatman v. Lasley
only in the language used.
The same principle of distinction runs with scarcely a variation
throughout the seemingly conflicting cases. Thus in the Pipe Line
Case,39 A granted to B, his heirs and assigns, a "right of way" ten
feet wide over his land to lay pipes for the transportation of petroleum.
The New Jersey Court held that B took an assignable interest, although
it could find no better reason for a perfectly sound decision than that the
grantee took "something more than an easement." The true reason
was that the easement, though in gross, was admeasurable. So all
railway, telegraph and telephone rights of way are admeasurable and
assignable.40  The same is true of the right to divert a certain amount of
water, to lay and maintain a sewer, to display advertisements on certain
walls and roofs, or to build and maintain a logging boom in a stream
upon the grantor's land.4'
Stockdale v. Yerden is one of the few cases that do not accord with
the principle stated. There a grantor reserved a right of way, held by
the court to be in gross, over the granted premises for the purpose of
removing the timber on an adjacent tract. On the sale shortly there-
after of this latter tract, he reserved to himself the timber and the right
" SuPra note 17.
"Supra note 28.
S tandard Oil Co. v. Buclii, szt'ra note 25.
' A railway company which acquires a right of way of a width prescribed by the
deed of grant or by statute obtains the right to make the fullest use of the land
within the boundaries fixed that may be required for its business. -The mere
fact that at first the whole width of the way is not used does not abridge this
right. Thence a subsequent increase of tracks or traffic is not a surcharge of the
servient land. Such a right of way is clearly admeasurable. See 2 Elliot, Rail-
roads (3d ed. 1g21) secs. 1170, 1281.
" See Cross v. Berlin Mills Co., supra note 28.
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of way. Subsequently by parol he attempted to transfer to the plaintiff
the timber and the right of way. Without commenting on the infor-
mality of the transfer the court held the easement not assignable since
it was in gross. It would seem, however, that since the 'easement,
limited to the timber haulage, was admeasurable, there was no danger
of a surcharge, and therefore no sufficient reason for depriving the
plaintiff of the interest which the parties intended he should have.
W. R. V.
OPPOSITION TO C0OPERATIVE MARKETING
The co6perative marketing movement in the United States which has
been engaging the interest of economists for the last twenty-five years
is now beginning to attract the attention of lawyers by the new and
varied problems which it presents. The decided cases are few and are
mainly concerned with the legality of the combinations or the remedies
available to the associations in enforcing their marketing agreements.
Legislatures everywhere have encouraged the co6perative organization
by legalizing their formation,1 and by exempting them from state and
federal laws against contracts in restraint of trade ;2 and have often
settled in favor of the association questions concerning the enforcement
of liquidated damage clauses and the application of equitable remedies.8
As fast as courts or legislatures settle problems, new ones are bound to
arise. Does the association acquire title to the products which it is
marketing, and if so what restrictions does the marketing contract
impose upon that title? One of the most important services to the
consumer which the co6perative association performs is the careful
sorting and grading of goods, but the pooling system itself involves
.For a list of state statutes see Henderson, Cogperative Marketing Associatioits
(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 91, note IO.
'The Clayton Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 730) exempts "labor,
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit" and provides that they
are not to be restrained from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof," and the Capper-Volstead Act expressly authorizes farmers to act
together in associations and make the necessary marketing agreements. Act of
February 18, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 388). Such organizations are also generally
excluded from state anti-trust statutes. CURRENT LEGISLATION (1922) 22 COL. L.
REV. 47o. For a collection of the statutes and a discussion of the decisions, see
Henderson, op. cit. supra note I, notes 21 and 22. Such statutory exemptions are
not unconstitutional on the ground of unequal protection of the laws. See Miller,
Farmers' Codperative Associations as Legal ComNiatalons (1922) 7 CORN. L.
QUART. 293. For a recent decision so holding, see Tobacco Growers' Coiperative
Ass'n. v. Jones (1923) N. C. Sup. Ct. No. 62.




many complicated problems of law. In obtaining loans must the
merchandise in each pool be dealt with separately when pledged by the
co6perative as security for advances? When are pool assets liable to
satisfy tort or contract claims against the association, and when corpor-
ate assets? Who must bear the ultimate burden of such recoveries ?,
All these problems are inherent in the contract.5 But an important
feature of the cobperative movement which does not appear in the
contract is the intense opposition which a new organization is bound to
create. It is a change from the established order and because it is a
change, the conservative farmer who perhaps reluctantly enters the
new enterprise is distrustful, and because it disturbs the existing trade
channels those whose business is necessarily interfered with are hostile.'
The glowing terms in which the organizer of the co6perative association
is likely to present its possibilities to the farmers are almost certain to
produce dissatisfaction if the first seasons do not yield astounding
profits. They find themselves under a contract to sell all their crops to
or through the association for a term of years, and now want to get
out of it. If farmers are induced to sign the membership agreement by
actual fraudulent misrepresentation of fact on the part of the organizer
or of the cobperative's agent after the association is organized, that may
be a ground for rescission of the contract.7  But in the ordinary case
the misrepresentation, if any, is merely a statement of opinion in legal
'Henderson, in an extended article, has analyzed the legal principles applicable
to the numerous contests likely to arise from the peculiar coaperative contract.
See Henderson, op. cit. supra note 1.
"Contracts" as here used refers to the articles of incorporation and by-laws
of the association as well as the agreements by which members contract to sell
exclusively to the co6perative.
' The Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that the Mennen Company
which offered a discount to wholesalers which it did not give to retailers was
justified in refusing the discount to a co5perative purchasing association composed
of retailers although they bought as large quantities as the wholesalers. Mennen
Co. v. Federal Trade Comoinsion (1923, C. C. A. 2d) Oct. Term, 1922, No. 69.
See a criticism of this decision pointing out that whether or not co6perative
purchasing will prove to be the change which our marketing system requires, it is
at least a possible improvement, and the Federal Trade Commission does not
exceed its powers by declaring a practice designed to destroy it "unfair competi-
tion." Oliphant, Trade Regulation (1923) 9 A. B. A. JOUR. 210.
" So where a promoter of a corporation induces the plaintiff to sign stock sub-
scription notes by false representations that bona fide subscribers for 30 shares
had already been obtained, the plaintiff may have the notes cancelled. Luetzke v.
Roberts (19o6) 130 Wis. 97, io9 N. W. 949. Some exaggeration of the advan-
tages to be enjoyed is to be expected, and the courts should require a misstatement
or a concealment of some material fact. See Central Ry. of Venezuela v. Kisch
(1867) L. R. 2 H. L. 99, 113. Where the promoter is guilty of actual fraud, the
subscriber may avoid the contract or affirm it and sue the promoter in tort; and
where the corporation has been a party to the fraud he may rescind his subscrip-
tion and recover the amount already paid. i Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private
Corporations, 340.
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contemplation; and the dissatisfied members find themselves held to
their contracts by the force of an injunction 8 until the new co6perative
has gained strength to fulfill the expectations of its members.9
A more insidious opposition is that which a newly organized associa-
tion arouses among the dealers who have formerly purchased the
farmers' crops,10 and who use stringent methods to defeat the co6pera-
live. A favorite means of attack is to induce some of the stronger
members to break their contracts with the association by offering them
high prices and in addition paying the liquidated damages for which the
members become liable under the contract. Inducing a breach of
contract is of course a tort for which damages may be collected from the
dealer,"- as well as liquidated damages from the members.'
2  But
payment of damages will not enable an association to function, to keep
its contracts for the resale of goods, to build up a clientele, and
" Equitable relief has been refused on the ground of lack of mutuality. Poultry
Producers v. Barlow (1922, Calif.) 2o8 Pac. 93. But it is usually granted. Phez
Co. v. Salem Fruit Union (1921) 103 Or. 514, 201 Pac. 222 (agency contract;
injunction held proper but award for damages substituted by equity where com-
pliance was no longer possible); Washington Cranberry Growers' Ass n. v. Moore
(192) 117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773 (injunction granted though specific perform-
ance would have been denied); American Sneling and Refining Co. v. Bunker
Hill & Sullivan Mining Co. (1918, D. Or.) 248 Fed. 172 (injunction and
specific performance granted) ; Hollingsworth v. Texas Hay Ass n. (1923, Tex.
Civ. App.) 246 S. W. io68 (injunction granted under a statute). On general
principles of equity both sales and agency contracts should be capable of being
specifically enforced. Arndt, The Law of California Co~perative Marketing Asso-
ciations (1920) 8 CALIF. L. REv. 281, 384; (1921) 9 ibid. 44.
'In a borderline case, however, query whether such quasi-misrepresentation while
not available as a defense at law, and not sufficient to sustain an action for
cancellation, may not be sufficient to serve as a defense against a suit for an
injunction or specific performance on the doctrine that he who comes into equity
must have clean hands?
" For a description of old methods of buying, see Sapiro, Rolling Their Own
(1923) 50 SURVEY:GRAePHIc i5; Leech v. Farmers' Tobacco Warehouse Co.
(1916) 7i Ky. 791, 188 S. W. 886.
"Lunley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216; Iron Molders' Union. v. Allis
Chalmers Co. (i9o8, C. C. A. 7th) 166 Fed. 45 (including apprentices under con-
tract to strike held a tort) ; Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (i923) 36 H~Av.
L. Rav. 663.
" Most of the co~perative marketing agreements contain a stipulation for the
payment of liquidated damages in the event of a breach of contract by a member.
For the importance to the association of having such a clause enforceable see
Henderson, op. cit. sapra note i, at p. 97. Such a provision is now generally not
considered a penalty and is enforced, though it has sometimes been held void as in
restraint of trade.
Void: Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co6perative Society (1913) i6o Iowa, 194,
14o N. W. 844; Burns v. Wray Farmers' Grain Co. (1918) 65 Colo. 425, 176 Pac.
487.
Enforced: Ex parte Baldwin County Produwers' Corp. (1919) 2 3 Ala. 345, 83
So. 69; Washington. Co6p. Egg & Poultry Assn. v. Taylor (1922, Wash.) 210
Pac. 806; see Consolidated Lumber Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1917) 33 Calif.
App. 698, 166 Pac. 385.
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strengthen its organization; so injunctions have been granted restrain-
ing members from selling to anyone else.' 3
Another source of attack is through the creditors of the farmer-
members who are usually heavily in debt to their landlord and particu-
larly to the storekeepers who have taken a lien on the crops. The lien
takes precedence over the association contract,14 so that by foreclosing
it, the storekeeper gets control of a large proportion of the crops which
he can then sell to the dealers, whereas the co6perative finds itself too
weak to occupy an influential position in the market and perhaps with
half enough goods to fill its contracts for resale. The co6peratives have
sometimes defended themselves by resorting to the boycott.' 5 How far
their use of this weapon is legal and to what extent strengthening the
co6perative is a justification for injury done has never been decided.
The simplest case, a direct primary boycott by members of the associa-
tion against the storekeeper, is probably not a tort to the storekeeper.
An individual or a group of individuals with closely allied interests may
refuse to deal with anyone they choose.'6 An ordinary association
" See supra note 8.
" Crops on which there is a chattel mortgage may not be sold so as to defeat
the mortgagee's lien. See S. C. Civil Code, 1912, secs. 4105, 4166; N. C. Cons.
Sts. 1919, secs. 2481, 2488.
"This particular form of boycott would be used only during the infancy of a
co6perative. A well-established association could borrow funds to make advances
to its members so that either the storekeeper would never get a mortgage on the
crops or he would be paid before he foreclosed. But the same principles apply to
other boycotts available to the co6perative as, for instance, to gain trade advan.
tages. A boycott has been used against a co6perative in such a way. Scottish
Codperative Wholesale Society v. Glasgow Fleslwrs' Ass't. (1898, Ct. of Session)
35 ScoT. L. REP. 645 (defendant association notified auctioneers they would bid
at no sale at which bids from co6perative stores were received).
"A direct primary boycott is often not called a boycott at all and is now
generally accepted as lawful. (1921) 3o YALE LAw JOURNAL, 501, 503. While it
is not true that a group can lawfully combine to do everything that it is lawful
for an individual to do, still a combination in itself is no longer considered tortious.
Pickett v. Walsh (19o6) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 8O9. And the group may cease working for or trading with any one in
order to carry out its lawful objects. Continental Insurance Co. v. Board of Fire
Underwriters (1895, C. C. N. D. Calif.) 67 Fed. 310 (agreement not to trade
with non-members); United States v. King (1915, D. Mass.) 229 Fed. 275,
aff'd. (1916, D. Mass.) 250 Fed. 908, (ass'n. could refuse to deal with black-
listed persons provided no attempt to coerce outsiders) ; Enpire Theater Co. v.
Cloke (1917) '53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. lO7 (members of labor union may combine
to boycott employer) ; Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (1921, C. C. A. 2d)
271 Fed. 140, (ass'n. of bill posters may refuse to accept advertising from solici-
tors not licensed by he ass'n.); but see National Fireproofing Co. v. Builders'
Ass'n (igog, C. C. A. 2d) i69 Fed. 259 (a combination to injure another without
benefit to itself held an illegal conspiracy). In cases of labor disputes the common
interest sufficient to justify a combination for protection has been extended to all
local unions in the same trade. Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalners Co. (19o8,
C. C. A. 7th) 166 Fed. 45. By allowing sympathetic strikes and secondary boy-
cotts of material, it has included organized labor more remotely concerned.
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would find this method of approach blocked by the anti-trust acts, but
agricultural associations not organized for profit are rather in the situa-
tion of labor unions, 7 and although their purpose is to establish a mono-
poly they are not for that reason illegal."'
Suppose the co6perative does not stop at a primary boycott but its
members also induce their supporters to join with them. Does this
additional fact make the boycott illegal? It seems that mere persuasion
which does not effect a breach of contract is no tort to the storekeeper.'
9
But as soon as the co6perative begins to use coercion, there exists the
typical case of a secondary boycott which is actionable unless it can be
Bossert v. Dhuy (1917) 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582; NOTES (1918) 31 HARV. L.
REV. 482.
" Supra note 2.
So long as the co5peratives "carry out their legitimate objects by lawful
means" they are not within the laws against restraint of trade. But extending a
boycott too far may not only be a common-law tort but may render the association
liable to triple damages under the anti-trust acts. To be illegal even at common
law restraint of trade must be unreasonable. Most cobperatives, although they are
or aim to be monopolies in fact, do not arbitrarily fix prices nor restrict crops,
nor are they socially injurious. Whether or not a particular cobperative does
unreasonably restrain trade must depend upon its own peculiar facts. Arndt,
op. cit. supra note 8. The modern tendency is to protect the co~perative.
Illegal as being in restraint of trade: Ford v. Chicago-Milk Shippers' Ass/n.
(I895) I55 Ill. 166, 39 N. E. 651; Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Coaperative
Society (1913) 16o Iowa, 194, 14o N. W. 844; Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnip-
seed (1913) 9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542; Burns v. Wray Farmers' Grain Co., supra
note 12.
Legal as not in restraint of trade: Owen County Tobacco Society v. Brumback
(198o) 128 Ky. 137, 107 S. W. 710; Castorland Milk and Cheese Co. v. Shantz
(919, Sup. Ct.) 179 N. Y. Supp. 131; Bullville Milk Producers' Ass'n. v. Arm-
strong (1919, Sup. Ct.) iO8 Misc. 582, 178 N. Y. Supp. 612; Ex parte Baldwin
County Producers' Corp., supra note 12; Poultry Producers v. Barlow, sapra
note 8.
For a study of the conditions which made co~peration among farmers necessary
and called for the protection of legislatures and courts, see Miller, op. cit. supra
note 2; Cf. COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 643.
"' Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation (19o7) 20 HARv. L. REV. 253, 266;
COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 4o4; see Amer. Fed. of Labor v. Buck
Stove Co. (1909) 33 App. D. C. 83 (Judge Van Orsdel's opinion). Courts have
even permitted the publication of unfair lists to friends and sympathizers.
Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed. of Labor (19o8) 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127;
Heitkamper v. Hoffman (1917, Sup. Ct.) 99 Misc. 543, 164 N. Y. Supp. 533.
Courts which have held such publications unlawful seem to have done so on the
ground that they were inherently coercive. Wilson v. Hey (io8) 232 Ill. 389,
83 N. E. 928. See collection of cases in Kales, Coercive and Competitive Methods
in Trade and Labor Disptens (1922) 8 CORN. L. QUART. I, 7. In most of these
cases in which persuasion was held unlawful there was coercion, disguised or
apparent, but there is a distinction between cases where economic pressure is
silently threatened and where this weapon is not even available to the persuading
party. See Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., supra note 16. In the case
of moral suasion, considerations of free speech should determine its legality.
Smith, loc. cit.; Amer. Fed. of Labor v. Buck Stone Co., supra.
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justified.2 0 Competition as a justification is not available because the
co6perative and the storekeeper are not in competition with each other
for relations with the third parties whom the defendant is attempting to
bring into the struggle.21  It is when the boycott succeeds and the
storekeeper capitulates that the dealer to whom the storekeeper would
have sold the crops which are now sold to the coperative enters upon
the scene as a plaintiff. Then there is a clear-cut case of a prima facie
tort-injury to a man in his trade-justified by competition. 22  Both
plaintiff and defendant are in direct and keen competition for relations
with the third party upon whom pressure is brought, and courts are not
likely therefore to interfere.
2 It is generally accepted that secondary boycotts are illegal either as common-
law conspiracies or as being in restraint of interstate commerce under the anti-trust
acts. COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 404, 501. Quinn v. Leatham
[19Ol, H.L.] A. C. 495, (common-law conspiracy); Loewe v. Lawler (igoS) 2o8
U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 302 (anti-trust act). In the latter case there is a difference
of opinion as to whether the injured party is limited to an action at law for triple
damages or may also sue for an injunction. Panw Lumber Co. v. Neal (097)
244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718; Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. (1894,
C. C. S. D. Ohio) 62 Fed. 803, 821. It is to be observed that when a co6perative
association makes use of a secondary boycott it brings itself once more within the
Federal Anti-Trust acts. As the court in Undted States v. King, supra note 16,
said, "I do not think that coercion of outsiders by a secondary boycott .... can
be held to be a lawful carrying out of the legitimate objects of such an association.
That act [the Clayton Act] means .... that organizations such as it describes are
not to be dissolved 'as in restraint of trade; but they are not privileged to adopt
methods of carrying on their business which are not permitted to other lawful
associations."
The question of the legality of boycotts (here as in labor disputes) must inevi-
tably be decided on social policy rather than legal principle. NOTES (1920) 20
COL. L. REv. 882. "The law is obviously lost when it attempts to value as
primary or secondary an interest for which a man will sacrifice money and
employment. But the law can weigh the social value of a stronger union with the
social loss involved in a widened struggle." NOTES (1918) 31 HARV. L. Rtv. 482,
484.
"Kales, op. cit. supra note 29, at p. 17.
= "The principle that all harm intentionally caused is actionable unless justified"
is "so fruitful and so flexible amid changing industrial conditions" that it cannot
"fail to gain a fast hold in Anglo-American law." NOTES (1915) 29 HARv. L.
REv. 86; see NOTES (1916) 28 HARV. L. REv. 696, note 5. If the plaintiff and
defendant are in competition with each other for trade relations with the third
party, pressure may justifiably be brought to bear upon the third party. Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McGregor [1892, H. L.] A. C. 25 (unusual inducements);
Allen v. Flood [1898, H. L.] A. C. i (threat to strike unless employer
discharged plaintiff) ; Kemp v. Division No. 24i (1912) 255 IIl. 213, 99 N. E. 389
(same).
To constitute a justificatio, the competition must be actual and not a mere
excuse for malicious injury to the plaintiff. London Guarantee Co. v. Horn
(1904) 206 Ili. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (procuring discharge of plaintiff employee in
order to injure plaintiff) ; Tuttle v. Buck (29o9) 2O7 Minn. 145, 229 N. W. 946;
see (922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 194; cf. Harelson v. Tyler (1920) 281 Mo.
383, 229 S. W. 9o8 (unlawful where motive is to oppress boycotted member).
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EXTENT OF A PARENT'S DUTY OF SUPPORT
Desirable as the rule seems, that a parent be under a legally enforce-
able duty to support his child, courts have been curiously unwilling so
to hold, even in cases of legitimate children.1 At common law in Eng-
land2 and in a few American states,3 this duty was considered merely
moral, and not sufficient to bind the father to third parties who furnished
necessaries. Such a doctrine, however, was too repugnant to a sense
of justice to stand long, and in the great majority of our jurisdictions
the duty is now held to be legal.' But despite such general recogni-
tion, enforcement has been peculiarly lax. In practically no case has
there been a direct sanction of the duty; in almost no case until now
has the child been allowed to enforce his right by a suit against his
parent directly.5 The reason given is that the child has adequate
remedies elsewhere, and that it is against public policy to encourage
suits between parent and child.6 But these other remedies are at most
merely indirect, and their adequacy is questionable. Third parties, it
is said, may furnish him necessaries and then sue the father.7  Recovery
there, however, is conditional on proof that the goods were necessaries,
and supplied with the express or implied consent of the parent., The
'Tiffany, Persons & Donestic Relations (3d ed. 1921) sec. 116.
'Mortimore v. Wright (840, Exch.) 6 M. & W. 481; Shelton v. Springett
(1851) 11 C. B. 452; Bazeley v..Forder (1868) L. R- 3 Q. B. 559.
'Kelley v. Davis (187o) 49"N. H. 187; Gordon v. Potter (1845) 17 Vt. 348;
Freeman v. Robinson (1876) 38 N. J. L. 383.
"Dunbar v. Dunhar (9o2) 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757; Rounds v. McDaniel
(1909) 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956; Alvey v. Hartzwig (19o7) io6 Md. 254, 67
Atl. 132; Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921) sec. 781. It is usually
expressly made so by statute. Such duty ceases on the child's becoming of age,
however wealthy the father may be, unless the child becomes chargeable to the
public as a pauper. Schouler, op. cit. sec. 795.
'Huke v. Huke (1891) 44 Mo. App. 308; Rawlings v. Rawlings (1919) 121
Miss. 14o, 83 So. 146. See Alling v. Ailing (1893) 52 N. J. Eq. 92, 27 Atl. 655.
In a few cases under exceptional circumstances such an action has been allowed.
Thus, in Paxton v. Paxton (1907) 150 Calif. 667, 89 Pac. lO83, under a statute,
an action for support by a helpless adult against his parent was sustained. See
(1912) i CALIF. L. REv. 65. And in Craig v. Slwa (1918) 1O2 Neb. 575, 168
N. W. 135, where a statute forbade bastardy proceedings to be brought by a
married woman, an illegitimate child was allowed to sue his father for support.
'See Hewlett v. George (1891) 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885. But this reason proves
too much, being equally applicable to a criminal prosecution instituted by the child
on its behalf.
ILufkin v. Harvey (1915) 131 Minn. 238, 154 N. W. io97; Michaels v. Flach
(1921) 197 App. Div. 478, 189 N. Y. Supp. 9o8; Armstrong Clothing Co. v. Boggs
(1912) go Neb. 499, 133 N. W. i (one) 122; Finn v. Adams (1904) 138 Mich. 258,
ioI N. W. 533; (1897) IO HAv. L. REv. 454.
' Schouler, op. cit. su-pra note 4, sec. 787. Where the parent neglects to provide
necessaries, the consent of the parent is implied by law and recovery allowed on a
quasi-contractual basis. There may also be an implied-in-fact consent by apparent
agency-but it is practically hard to conceive of where the parent has abandoned
his child.
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difficulty of such proof and the almost certain necessity of a lawsuit
will preclude credit being given in any but tie hardest circumstances,
and in many cases the remedy will be actually insufficient. Likewise
it is suggested that a parish or county that has supplied necessaries to
a destitute child may recover from the father. But no law should
require a child to become the object of public charity before what the
law admits is its legal right can be enforced. It is also pointed out that
the child may prosecute the father criminally for failure to support. 0
Yet such relief is unavailable against the father unless he is personally
within the jurisdiction, nor is it of any use against his property.
Mother and child are often reluctant to use it, and even if they do,
sending the father to jail does not solve the problem of support. The
application of such relief thus defeats its own ends, its real potency being
as a threat and an incentive to the father to perform his duty. An
action by the mother on the child's behalf" seems to be the child's most
practical remedy, but even there the court can not be sure the money
will in fact reach the child.
If the court recognizes that there is a legal duty resting on the father,
it seems only consistent that it directly sanction such duty in an action
by the child against the father.1 2  Right and remedy are reciprocal, and
to deny the remedy is to deny the right. Public policy should encourage
the remedy rather than the contrary." The Supreme Court of Kansas
'See Shelton v. Springett, szpra note 2; Guthrie County v. Conrad (1907) 133
Iowa, 171, IIo N. W. 454.
"0 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note I, 328, and cases cited. There are in general two
types of statutes: (i) Those making it a penal offense for a parent to abandon or
neglect to support his minor children. Brown v. State (905) 122 Ga. 568, 50
S. E. 378. There are three views as to the place where this crime is committed:
(a) Where the abandonment first began. Ware v. State (1910) 7 Ga. App. 797,
68 S. E. 443; Boyd v. State (1916) 18 Ga. App. 623, 89 S. E. io9i. (b) Where
the father is to be found. State v. Fick (1917) 14o La. lO63, 74 So. 554; Comnon-
wealth v. Acker (i9o8) 197 Mass. 91, 83 N. E. -312. (c) Where the child is
when the complaint is made. Ex parte Lewis (911) 34 Nev. 28, 115 Pac. 729. It
is no defense to prosecution under such a statute that third parties are in fact
furnishing necessaries. Hunter v. State (1913) IO Okla. Cr. i19, 134 Pac. 1134;
L. R. A. I9i5A, 564, note. (2) Those modeled after (i6oi) 43 Eliz. c. 2, provid-
ing that the father, mother, grandfather and grandmother of poor, old, blind, lame,
and impotent persons shall maintain them. See Garland v. Dover (1841) 19 Me,
441; Manthey v. Schueler (914) 126 Minn. 87, 147 N. W. 824.
"Pretzinger v. Pretzinger (1887) 45 Ohio St. 452, .5 N. E. 471; Rogers V.
Rogers (914) 93 Kan. 114, 143 Pac. 42o. There is probably one additional
indirect sanction, under the rule as to pre-existing duty, in that courts would refuse
to regard a father's support of, or promise to support, his child as sufficient con-
sideration to sustain an executory contract in his favor; and in that. a contract
looking toward non-support would probably be unenforceable as against public
policy.
" See NoTEs (I920) 6 VA. L. Rav. 448, urging such a result, but see COMMENT
(1920) 14 ILL. L. REV. 645, approving of Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra note 5.
" "What kind of a society is it that will be more disturbed by a suit in equity,
than it will be when helpless children are allowed to go hungry and unclothed,
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has therefore taken an important step in the development of the law of
parent and child by holding, in Doughty v. Engler (1923, Kan.) 211
Pac. 619, that such duty is directly enforceable through an action by the
child against the father.
In holding in the same case that the father of an illegitimate child is
under a non-statutory legal duty to support it, the court set a second
and equally important precedent. At common law it has been univer-
sally held that the putative father is under no duty to maintain his
bastard child.14 There is a sufficient moral obligation, however, to
support his promise of maintenance. 5 This obligation has now been
made legal practically everywhere and enforceable under bastardy
statutes.16 The Kansas court now says that, in addition to this statutory
remedy, there is a common-law duty to support the child which the
latter may directly enforce. This duty, according to the opinion, arises
from parenthood alone.
There is much conflict in the cases as to what constitutes the basis of
the so-called legal duty of support. Two theories are presented' 7 : first,
that it is correlative to and dependent on the parent's right to the custody
and services of the child; second, that it springs from the fact of
parentage. Thus where a father totally emancipates his child and
thereby renounces all right to its services and custody, it is held that he
relieves himself of all duty of support.'8 And sometimes where the
divorce decree has awarded the custody of the child to the mother, the
father is no longer liable for its maintenance. 19 Likewise in the cases
their vitality so lowered by starvation and exposure as to make them invalids,
unable to perform the functions of citizenship, but on the contrary make them a
burden and perhaps a menace to society. If there be such society in existence it
ought to be kicked off the earth and forced to do its reposing in the abysmal pits
of Gehenna, where children do not go." Ethridge J., in a dissenting opinion,
Rawlings v. Rawlings, supra note 5, at p. 185, 83 So. at p. 158. The objection to
a suit between parent and child should certainly be valueless where the parent is
failing in his most elementary duty.
"4 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note I, 3o6; Nixon v. Perry (1887) 77 Ga. 530, 3 S. E.
253; Simmons v. Bull (1852) 21 Ala. 501.
Trayer v. Setzer (1904) 72 Neb. 845, lOI N. W. 989.
"Tiffany, op. cit. sitpra note i, 3o6-3o7. As to procedure and evidence under
these statutes, see 56 Am. Dec. 21o-223, note.
"7 That is, they seem to underly the reasoning of the cases, although few courts
definitely say what they consider the basis.
" Iroquois Iron Co. v. Ind. Corn. (1920) 294 Ill. io6, 128 N. E. 289 (son's right
to compensation for deceased. father); Brosius v. Barker (1911) 154 Mo. App.
657, 136 S. W. 18 (action by third party against father for necessaries). The
soundness of this rule may be questioned. Cf. note 24, infra. But the father who
only partially emancipates his child is still under a duty of support. Porter v.
Powell (189o) 79 Iowa, 151, 44 N. W. 295 (action by a third party against father
for necessaries) ; Lufkin v. Harvey, supra note 7.
" Brownt v. Smith (1895) ig R. I. 319, 33 Atl. 466 (action by mother against
father's estate for support rendered) ; Finch v. Finch (1853) 22 Conn. 411 (action
by mother against father for support rendered). These cases do not, however,
represent the prevailing rule. See infra note 27.
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of a widowed mother 20 or a step-father21 the right to the custody and.
services is generally considered correlative to the duty of support. But
in cases where it would be manifestly unjust to allow the father to escape
liability by giving up his right to the services and custody of the child,
the courts have discarded the first test and held the duty to be a natural
one based on the fact of generation.2 2  The parent by bringing a child
into the world has brought upon himself the obligation of providing for
that child.2 3  Such obligation should be absolute, and not conditional on
the right to the services or custody of the child. Some cases tend to
carry this out. So where an emancipated24 or adult2 5 child becomes
helpless, the parent must support it. The father who has driven his
son from his house,20 or who has been deprived of its custody through
"See Horgan v. Pacific Mills (1893) 158 Mass. 402, 33 N. E. 581 (action by
mother against third party for loss of services) ; McGarr v. Nat. Mills (19o2) 24
R. I. 447, 53 Atl. 320 (action by mother against third party for loss of -services).
A widowed mother is under a duty to support her minor child. See Dedhain v.
Natick (iSi) 16 Mass. 134 (action by one town against another for support of
pauper child) ; Schouler, op. cit. supra note 4, sec. 782. This duty, however, is not
absolute, and if the child has a separate estate of its own, she may reimburse
herself therefrom. Pyatt v. Pyatt (1889) 46 N. J. Eq. 285, 18 Atl. 1O48 (action
by mother against child for support rendered) ; In re Besondy (2884) 32 Minn.
385, 20 N. W. 366.
"See Magnuson v. O'Dea (913) 75 Wash. 574, 135 Pac. 64o (stepfather a
necessary party to action against third party for kidnapping child). A husband is
under no duty to support his stepchild unless he voluntarily assumes the relation
of parent. In re Besoany, supra note 2o. But where he assumes such position,
that is, by taking a child in to his family as his own, he is liable. In re Harris
(1914) 16 Ariz. I, 140 Pac. 825 (stepfather had no right to remuneration against
child's estate) ; Ann. Cas. i9i6A, 175, note; see (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOuRNAL,
100-101.
'See Pretzinger v. Pretzhnger, supra note II, at p. 458, 15 N. E. at p. 473.
"Duty of father to provide reasonably for the maintenance of minor children ....
is a principle of natural law. . . . This natural duty is not to be evaded by the
husband's so conducting himself as to render it necessary to dissolve the bonds of
matrimony and give the mother the custody and care of the infant offspring." See
also Alvey v. Hartvig, s ipra note 4 (action by mother). Another reason given
is that it is'not the policy of the law to deprive children of their rights on account
of the dissensions of their parents, and by proceedings to which they are not parties.
COMMENT (1916) 4 CALIF. L. R!v. 418.
=I Blackstone, Comnmentaries *447.
'See Hendrickson v. Tount of Queen (1921) 149 Minn. 79, 182 N. W. 952
(action by third party against town for services rendered). The dicta in this case
were influenced by a pauper statute (see supra note io) which may distinguish it
from cases in note 18 supra.
Crain V. Mallone (1908) 13o Ky.. 125, 113 S. W. 67 (action to settle parent's
estate). The court admits that the mother would not be liable to third parties
for support rendered, but insists that she is under a duty to support-probably
analogous to that imposed by the pauper statute.
"Hunycutt &. Co. v. Thompson (1912) 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628 (action by
third party for necessaries).
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the divorce court,2 7 must still support it. If such a duty springs from
the mere fact of parentage, it seems equally applicable to the illegitimate
child. The Kansas court in so applying it has added to the law a
substantial step which is seemingly endorsed by public opinion.2 8
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MINIMUM WAGE
The Supreme Court in the case holding unconstitutional the minimum
wage law for women' has again driven logic to an extreme which
challenges the soundness of its political judgment and intuitions.
Thirteen states had had minimum wage laws in force for more or less
long periods, and three states had held them constitutional.2  None
had held them unconstitutional. The measures adopted thus repre-
sented a popular conviction as to social needs, and whatever infringe-
ment of the law of supply and demand they may have involved appeared
to be counterbalanced by the resulting social advantages. They were
enacted because it was commonly believed, whether rightly or wrongly,
that extremely low wages to women had a direct relation to morality
and the health of the community, and that the law subserved an impor-
tant public purpose in maintaining for women a "decent standard of
living." *Most of the laws were flexible in permitting modification for
good reason shown to an administrative board.
In the determination of social- questions of this type, the court had
previously held in a series of cases subsequent to the rigidly logical
reasoning of the Lochner bakeshop case2 that the will of the people
acting through state legislatures in the exercise of the police power was
the judge of the policy to be pursued, provided it had a reasonable
foundation, and that it was not the function of the Supreme Court to
interpose its own views of policy or economics f.or those of the legisla-
G illey v. Gilley (1887) 79 Me. 292, 9 At. 623, (action by mother). Where
the divorce decree awards the custody of the child to the mother, but says nothing
about support, the prevailing rule is that the father is still liable. Schouler, op. cit.
supra note 4, sec. 796; Bennett v. RobiNson (1914) ISo Mo. App. 56, 165 S. W.
856 (action by mother) ; Winner v. Schucart (1919) 2o2 Mo. App. 176, 215 S. W.
905 (action by mother). For cases contra, see sapra note ig. Likewise a separa-
tion agreement does not relieve the father from the duty of support. Maxwell v.
Boyd (9o7) 123 Mo. App. 334, 100 S. W. 540 (action by trustee against father
for support) ; McCarter v. McCarter (1912) 2o Ga. App. 754, 74 S. E. 308
(action by mother).
"Such public opinion has been recently crystallized in two states by statutes
holding every child to be the legitimate offspring of its natural parents and as
such entitled to support and education to the same extent as if born in lawful
wedlock. N. D. Sess. Laws, 1917, ch. 70; Ariz. Sess. Laws, 1921, ch. 114-
'Minimum Wage Board v. Children's Hospital (Apr. 9, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct.,
Oct. Term, 1922, Nos. 795 and 796.
'See COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 388.
'Locliner v. New York (905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539.
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ture. Thus were sustained, in the Muller case,4 laws limiting the work-
ing hours of women in industry to eight, and in the Bunting case,5
which was deemed to overrule the Lochner case, laws limiting the work-
ing hours of men in all manufacturing establishments-not merely in
special occupations as the majority in the instant case assumed-+, ten,
with a provision for time and a half for overtime for three hours in
emergencies. While a statute controlling the hours of labor, it was
also frankly recognized as a statute indirectly controlling wages.
Other laws interfering freely with the alleged liberty of contract, and
designed to ameliorate the conditions of labor in the interest of public
welfare were sustained, and justified Mr. Warren's thesis of 1913 as
to "The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court." 6
Now after all these years comes the Supreme Court'with a somewhat
altered membership and in a majority opinion using arguments
similar to those believed to be discredited since the Lochner case, the
majority hold invalid in a five to three (practically five to four) deci-
sion, the minimum wage law for women of the District of Columbia, a
law similar to that under which thirteen states had for years been acting
and which several state courts had held constitutional. This is done on
the ground that the liberty of contract is unduly interfered with and
that since women now have the vote they do not, it would seem, need
the law's protection against dangers to their health or morals- a curious
non sequitur-and that to establish the minimum wage would also justify
the fixing of a maximum wage-another non sequitur, as the minority
points out and a conclusion which some critics have attacked as the
manifestation of a hypocritical and unfounded solicitude for labor.
The argument of the majority is founded on the major premise of an
established full equality of opportunity and bargaining power between a
female employee and her prospective employer, and is supported by
economic and social considerations which challenge the wisdom and the
economic justification of such a measure. It overlooks the ever present,
often unexpressed element in constitutional interpretation and the
development of the police power, namely, the social views of the
majority of the community as to the public policy underlying legislation
of the type in question, a factor which the Supreme Court should disre-
gard only in the most extreme cases. It is believed that the minimum
wage law did not present such a case. The majority in effect say that
the conditions of fact on which this legislation was based either do not
exist or that the means employed were inappropriate to the end in view,
either conclusion involving an unjustified assumption of legislative
ignorance of facts or means. While employers are by the legislation
subjected to a minimum wage overhead, this restriction upon earnings,
if any, is no more violent than the restrictions upon earnings already
'Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324.
Bunting v. Oregon (1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435.
13 CoL. L. txv. 294.
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in force in the rent laws and in many illustrations of price fixing.
While the Supreme Court is accustomed to criticism for unpopular
decisions, the majority would appear to be using poor judgment in
substituting, in cases involving doubtful and debatable questions of
public policy, its own views of social and economic policy for that of the
people. This was not, it is believed, Marshall's original purpose in
reading into the constitution the power to hold legislation unconstitu-
tional; and at a time when established institutions are under challenge
generally, it is believed that the decision will stimulate the movement
for a definite limitation on the court's power over legislation.
E. M. B.
MUTUALITY IN ACTIONS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Fry's rule of mutuality,1 though perhaps never a correct description
of the rule in England,2 was followed by some text writers3 and juris-
dictions4 in this country. The cases on specific performance in New
York have been in confusion, but the Court of Appeals frequently
followed Fry's rule.5 But, as has been pointed out, lack of mutuality
is a reason for refusing specific performance because it would be unjust
to the defendant to compel him to perform, and not because either party
has the privilege not to perform. 6  So if the court by its decree can
compel the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, there is no
longer a want of mutuality of remedy.7
"A contract to be specifically enforced by the Court must, as a general rule, be
mutual, that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have
been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them." Fry, Specific
Performance of Contracts (6th ed. 1921) sec. 460.
Some of the English cases contrary to the rule are Hatton v. Gray (1684) 2
Ch. Cas. 164 (specific performance granted though contract unenforceable against
the plaintiff under the Statute of Frauds) ; Clayton v. Ashdozvnt (1714, Ch.) 9
Vin. Abr. 393 (G. 4), pl. I (contract with minor enforced against adult) ; Fennelly
v. Anderson (1851) I Ir. Ch. 7o6 (contract of married woman enforced);
Turner v. Moy (1875, Ch.) 32 L. T. R. 56 (unilateral contract where the plaintiff
had performed.)
34 Pomeroy, Equity .urispruedeice (4th ed. 1919) sec. 1405. "It must be, in
general, mutual in its obligation and in its remedy"; but see the note: "There
are so many exceptidns .... that the rule is far from universal."4 Norris v. Fox (I89I, C. C. N. D. Mo.) 45 Fed. 4o6. See COMMENTS (917)
:27 YALE LAW -JOURNAL, 261.
'Stokes v. Stokes (1896) 148 N. Y. 708, 43 N. E. 211; Wadick v. Mace (i9o8)
191 N. Y. I, 83 N. E. 571; Levin v. Dietz (i9o9) 194 N. Y. 376, 87 N. E. 454.
Stone, The "Mutuality" Rule in New York (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 443.
" "Equity will not grant the plaintiff specific performance of a bilateral contract
if, after the defendant's forced performance, the plaintiff's own obligation will
remain unperformed and is of such a nature that, at the time for its fulfillment,
equity would, on grounds independent of mutuality, refuse specific performance
of it,-the one possible limitation to this rule being that equity might give the
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The New York court finally adopted this view in Epstein v. Gluckin,
where the assignee of the vendee of a contract for the sale of land
brought a bill for specific performance against the vendor. Since the
assignee had not assumed the obligations of the contract the Appellate
Division refused relief on the ground of lack of mutuality.8 The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision, saying that the assignee by invoking
the aid of equity "assumed the duty" of performance thus making it
possible for the court to do justice.9 The earlier New York cases 0
following Fry's rule were confined to their own facts, for the court
said: "If there ever was a rule that mutuality of remedy existing, not
merely at the time of the decree, but at the time of the formation of the
contract, is a condition of equitable relief .... it has ceased to be a rule
to-day."
In a recent case, H. and H. Corp. v. Broad Holding Corp. (1923,
N. Y.) 204 App. Div. 569, the assignee of the vendee sued the vendee
for the return of the money paid for the assignment on the ground that
the vendor could not convey a clear title on the day fixed. In the
answer, the vendee set up a counterclaim for specific performance to
compel the assignee to pay the purchase price to the vendor. The
court held that the assignee by demanding performance from the
vendor, had subjected himself to the duties of the contract, and that
the vendor could have specific performance against him, inasmuch as
under Epstein v. Gluckin the assignee could have specific performance
against the vendor. This decision, which gives mutuality of remedy
at the time of bringing the action as a reason for granting specific per-
formance, is opposed to the reasoning of the Epstein case which requires
mutuality at the time of the decree. The assignee, in demanding per-
formance on the day, did not subject himself to the duty of performance
even under Epstein v. Gluckin, for there he actually started an action
for specific performance. In that case justice was done since the vendor
was required to perform his part of the agreement and he was given
the full compensation provided by the contract. The instant case, in
forcing the assignee, who did not assume the obligations of the contract,
to perform, gives the vendor a right he did not have under the contract
and imposes upon the assignee a duty he never undertook."3
plaintiff specific performance if the defendant's assumed common law remedy for
damages would be fully adequate." COaMENTS, supra note 4. Jones v. Newhall
(1874) 115 Mass. 244 is also cited as inferential of the suggested limitation.
8Epstein v. Gluckin (1920) 193 App. Div. 9o6, 183 N. Y. Supp. 947.
(1922) 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861.
"See supra note 5.
'The court treats the case as if the vendor were, demanding specific perform-
ance when in fact the vendee sought this relief, and the vendor was only a party
defendant. The question arises as to what was the nature of the contract of
assignment. If the vendee gave his right to buy the land in return for a specific
sum of money plus the assignee's promise to buy the land, the vendee should be
able to enforce the contract. The vendor could enforce it as a third party bene-
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING LAWS
Developments in recent local zoning under the state zoning acts of
New Jersey demonstrate that the validity of such laws depends to a
great extent upon the complexion of the court reviewing them. The
two legislative acts in New Jersey, one for cities,' the other for muni-
cipalities, 2 have the same purpose and use almost the identical language
of the New York acts.3  The latter have permitted all the necessary
"use" and "bulk" zoning contemplated,4 and yet in the. five cases pre-
senting the issue to New Jersey courts, although the legislative acts
themselves have not been pronounced unconstitutional, every ordinance
of the municipality or city attempting to carry out the zoning powers
supposedly granted by the legislature has been held invalid.' New
Jersey seems to be recapitulating the history of zoning laws in the
United States, which at first met the cry "aesthetic purposes only," 6
ficiary even though the assignee made no promise to him. Lawrence v. Fox
(1859) 2o N. Y. 268.. If, as was probably the case, the vendee assigned his right
in return for a specific amount only, neither the vendee nor the vendor should have
specific performance against the assignee. But, assuming that the vendor was
willing and able to convey title in accord with the terms of the contract, the
assignee could not get back his payment whether he carried out the contract or
not. Doubtless, since the court found that the failure of the vendor to clear off
the incumbrance before the day did not justify the arbitrary rejection of the title,
as a practical matter the assignee would rather perform, unless the land had
greatly decreased in value.
'N. J. Laws, 192o, ch. 229.
'Ibid. ch. 240.
'N. Y. Laws, 1914, ch. 47o, as amended by Laws, 1916, ch. 497, 503, and Laws,
1917, ch. 6oi. This has been the model for the later complete zoning laws.
'Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp. (1920) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E.
209. For procedure necessary to break down or into a zone-a wise provision for
flexibility and growth, see People of N. Y., ex rel. Sheldon, v. Board of Appeals
(1923) 234 N. Y. 484.
'Blakeslee v. Mayor of Jersey City (1921) 95 N. 3. L. 284, 112 Att. 593 (no
power to mark out a residential district); Village of South Orange v. Heller
(1921, N. J.) 113 AtI. 697 (attempt to make residential district void because
village board of trustees given discretion to allow shops, etc., on hearing, and no
such discretion mentioned in the legislature's act, [see Peaple of N. Y. v. Bd. of
Appeals, supra note 4] ) ; Ronumr Realty Co. v. Board of Commrs. of Haddonfield
(1921) 96 N. J. L. 117, 114 Atl. 248 (attempt to create two-family or more resi-
dence district, by prohibiting one-story buildings [generally used for garages or
shops] held void; court said only purpose was aesthetic) ; Cliffside Park Realty
Co. v. Borough of Cliffside (1921) 96 N. J. L. 278, 114 Atl. 797 (legislative act
itself said to be constitutional, but held no issue made in this case as to the muni-
cipal ordinance); Dorison v. Saul (1922, N. J.) Ii8 Atl. 691 (attempt to keep
section for business by prohibiting buildings less than three stories held invalid,
court saying under power to "limit and regulate" cannot raise height) ; Handy v.
Village of South Orange (1922, N. J.) ii8 Atl. 838 (residential section with only
one-family houses invalid, not within statute, not shown how related to health,
safety or welfare).
'People, ex rel. Friend, v. Chic. (1913) 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 6og; Willison v.
Cooke (1913) 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828; Calvo v. City of New Orleans (915)
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but now have been enveloped in the protecting phrase "for the general
safety, health and welfare."'7
As at present understood "zoning" means a complete use and bulk
(the latter includes area and height) regulation, carried out by divi-
sion into districts, with differing regulations for different districts.8
In this complete form New York, Massachusetts, the District of
Columbia, Wisconsin, Alameda, California, and East Cleveland, Ohio,
are the pioneers.' Although the zoning on the Pacific coast is more
elaborately districted, the fundamental divisions are (i) residential,(2) business, (3) light industrial, (4) heavy industrial.o In its
entirety, it may be said that such zoning has generally been held valid."
And yet individual zoning provisions, such as height or use limitations,
have often in the past twenty-five years been held invalid. 2 That may
explain why a particular part of a general valid zoning law may be held
invalid, depending on the local history and setting of that particular
provision.3'
Various classifications have been attempted in analyzing the reason for
court approval in one instance and disapproval in the same or another
instance. One writer refers to the form of the regulation, whether
by constitutional amendment, legislative act, general municipal charter,
or special municipal charter.' 4  Another considers it from the point of
view of the use of the power of eminent domain, or the police power. 5
Such classification can be of little value, since different courts have held
136 La. 480, 67 So. 338; State, ex rel. Blaise, v. City of New Orleans (1917) 142La. 74, 76 So. 244; Henry D. Chandler, The Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty
(1922) 8 A. B. A. JoUR. 470; (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 783; Williams,
The Law of City Planning and Zoning (1922) 381, part VI.
'Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 284-292.
'Ibid. part IV, ch. i, p. 198, II, III; NOTES AND COMMENT (1920) i MicH. L.
REv. 191.
'Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 293. New York was the first of these, having
enacted such legislation in 1914.
"Ibid. 291, 273, 267.
"Opinion of Justices (192o) 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525; Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Williams Bldg. Corp., supra note 4; Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 284-29o.
" Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 265. Perhaps the first conscious zoning provi-
sion in the United States was a federal statute limiting the heights of buildings by
zones in Washington, D. C. Act of March I, 1899 (30 Stat. at L. 922).
" See Ronzar Realty Co. v. Board of Commnzrs., supra note 5; Handy v. Village
of South Orange, supra note 5.
NOTE AND COMMENT, supra note 8.
'
5 NOTES (1920) 34 HARv. L. Rzv. 419. Where purely aesthetic considerations
are involved, it seems to be settled today that only the power of eminent domain
can be used-which is a development from the time when aesthetic purposes could
not be served at all, constitutionally. But it has also been said, quite as strongly,
that if the police power is being used where health, safety and welfare are the
primary considerations, incidental aesthetic ones will not render the law invalid.
Chandler, op. cit. supra note 6. See NOTES, supra, 420.
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provisions in a class, valid, and others in the same class invalid.16
It is believed that the only classification-if it can be called such-is
that based on the court's own recognition of the necessity of such leg-
islation for the health, safety, comfort, and welfare of the community,
and the court's attitude, is, of course, a reflection of the community's
attitude.1 7
This is shown by the type of provision first held valid. Certain
forms of "zoning" provisions existed long before they were recognized
as such, as for example, in the regulation of "nuisances" such as
slaughter houses, laundries, tallow chandlers, quarries, saloons, fac-
tories offensive to the senses, etc.,.and in fire and safety regulations as
to height, area, and use of buildings. These have been almost univer-
sally supported.' 8 It is only when such regulations vary in different
parts of the city that their legality is challenged on the ground of
unequal protection of the laws.19 Almost universally when "nuisances"
(or heavy industrials) of the type just mentioned were excluded from
certain zones, as for example, residence or business districts, courts
gave their sanction. The relation to health and comfort was plain.20
The same was true for fire and safety regulations of height, area and
use in zones. 2 1 But where businesses-grocery shops, auto service sta-
tions, and so on-were excluded from residence sections, or apartments
forbidden in one or two family sections, the argument that this was
class legislation and confiscation for aesthetic purposes was made.2 2
The relationship here to. health, safety and welfare is not so obvious.
Some courts themselves found a relationship between planned cities
and a better citizenry,23 but it was not until lawyers, profiting by the
" The most striking example of this is the zoning accomplished and held
valid under the New York acts, and the zoning not accomplished under the similar
laws passed in New Jersey under the same circumstances. Supra notes i, 2, 3, 4,
5; Williams, op. ct. supra note 6, 293, 298, 301. In both cases acts similarly
worded and passed under the police power delegated to cities of certain classes
local police power for zoning. Also compare the Minnesota case-valid zoning by
the exercise of eminent domain-with the New York and New Jersey situation.
State, ex reL Twin City Bldg. and Inv. Co., v. Houghtm (igi) 144 Minn. I, 174
N. W. 885, 176 N. W. I59.
"' Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 173. "My duty as judge
may be to objectify in law, not my own aspirations and convictions and philoso-
phies, but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of the men and women
of my time."
"
8Ex Parte Hadacheck (1916) 65 Calif. 417, 132 Pac. 584; Hadacheck v.
Los Angeles (I915) 239 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 143; Shtea v. City of Muncie
(1897) 148 Ind. 14, 46 N. E. 138; Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 283, 285.
19Ibid. 283.
"Supra note 18; (igig) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 109.
' Supra note 18.
Supra note 6.
= State v. Houghton, supra note 16, at p. 20. "Giving the people a means to
secure for that portion of a city wherein they establish their homes, fit and
harmonious surroundings, promotes contentment, induces further efforts to enhance
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course of labor welfare legislation,2 4 presented to the courts extensive
statistics and data that the constitutionality of zoning laws began to be
more widely conceded.2 5  And as in the field of labor welfare legisla-
tion, different courts have different stopping places. Few, for
example, dispute the advisability of a ten hour law; many have yet to
be convinced that an eight hour law is constitutional. 26  So the majority
of courts recognize that heavy industrial establishments should be
permitted only in certain districts of a city, but few feel that even the
better apartment houses are in the end as fatal to the existence of the
one-family and the two-family residence section.
2 7
Some decisions suggest that in entering so debatable a field of pub-
lic enterprise the result should be accomplished through the power of
eminent domain, and not the police power.28  Not long ago it was
debated whether it could be done even by eminent domain .2  Further-
more, this position necessitates entrance into the contest over the alleged
difference between the affirmative taking for use by the public-which
is listed as eminent domain-and the negative prevention of use by the
owner for the public-which is generally considered within the exer-
cise of the police power.2 0 It has been said that the dividing line is
an artificial one, and that in all such cases compensation should be made.
Thus, it has been argued that prohibition should have been accomplished
by eminent domain, and compensation should have been made to brew-
ery owners whose property has unquestionably been confiscated for
the public good, although not physically "taken over" by the public.
There is logic in this argument, yet social progress in all directions
would be considerably retarded if the police power were so curtailed.
Perhaps the test should be the margin of harm to all society-balanced
against the margin of harm to the individual.8 ' Possibly the socialistic
flavor of confiscation without compensation may have influenced the
the appearance and value of the home, fosters civic pride, and thus tends to produce
a better type of citizen."
" Muller v. Oregon (19o8) 208 U. S. 412, 420, 421, 28 Sup. Ct 324, 326. Brief
by Louis Brandeis and Miss Josephine Goldmark.
' Welch v. Swasey (19o7) 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745; see (1922) 20 MICE. L.
REv. 455; see Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 283.
Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law (1916) 29
HARV. L. RE. 353. See also the recent decision of the Supreme Court declaring
a minimum wage law for the District of Columbia invalid, after every state
court passing on the same question had pronounced minimum wage laws valid.
Minimum Wage Board v. Ctlzdren's Hospital (Apr. 9, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct.
Term, 1922, Nos. 795 and 796; COMMENTS (923) 32 Y.LE LAW JOURNAL, 388;
ibid. 829.
See Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 284, 285.
See Willison v. Cooke, supra note 6.
See dissenting opinion, State v. Houghton, supra note 16.
"COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 17,; Freund, Police Power (19o4)
sec. 5,1 et seq.; Williams, op. cit. supra note 6, 15, 25.
" Ibid. 25, 26.
COMMENTS
New Jersey court in rejecting the attempted application of the zoning
law. The one possible conclusion is that the same thing which makes
the dividing line between those who said that zoning could not be legally
accomplished at all and those who say it can be done by eminent domain
is what makes the difference between those who say it can be done only
by eminent domain and those who say it can be done by the police
power, and in all cases that will be the individual's-or the court's-fun-
damental belief in the necessity of that change for the general safety,
health, comfort, and welfare.3 2  The "inarticulate major premise",
is still with us," but the progress of zoning laws in the twenty-five
years of their existence can leave little question that they will eventually
be sustained. 3
4
The legal relations arising from the payment of a check over a forged
endorsement of the payee's name still trouble the courts. It is generally
conceded that the drawee bank cannot charge its drawer's account with
such checks.1 The bank may reimburse itself by recovery from the
person to whom it paid the proceeds, 2 and normally the ultimate loss
falls on the person who dealt with the forger. Yet in a recent case,
dustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank (1922, Ill.) 137 N. E.
793, the drawer was allowed to recover the proceeds of such a check from
a defendant who had received payment from the drawee bank. The
question arises as to whether the drawer has such a property interest
in the check as to enable him to maintain the statutory equivalent of
trover for its conversion. If the drawer's negligence facilitates the
loss, the drawee may charge his account.3  And if the drawee bank
= Cardozo, op cit. supra note 17, 167-177, Subconscious Forces.
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 511.
Growing Importance of "Zoning" (1922) 8 A. B. A. JOUR. 456.fordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmnut Bank (19o9) 2o1 Mass. 397, 87 N. E.
74o; Miner's Bank v. St. Loiis Smelting Co. (1915, Mo. App.) 178 S. W. 211;Patton, Legal Opinios (I92I) sec. i42o. The same rule applies where thedrawer's signature has been forged. McKeen v. Boatmen's Bank (1898) 74 Mo.
App. 281; Morgan v. United States Mortgage Co. (1913) 2o8 N. Y. 218, IO
N. E. 871. And to cases of raised or altered checks. Commercial Bank v. Arden,(1917) 177 Ky. 520, 197 S. W. 951; Chicago Bank v. Block (i9o6) 126 Il1. App.
128.
'Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany (1841, N. Y.) i Hill, 287. And so in case of
an alteration of the amount. McClendon v. Bank of Advance (1915) 188 Mo. App.
417, 174 S. W. 203. But not in case of a forgery of the drawer's signature, atleast, in the absence of negligence on the part of the bank which dealt with the
forger. Price v. Neal (762, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1354; United States v. Bank of New
York (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 219 Fed. 648.
'A typical case is where the drawer negligently delivers or mails a checkpayable to "John Jones" to the wrong "John Jones." Weisberger Co. v. Barber-
ton Bank (1911) 84 Ohio St. 2Z, 95 N. E. 379. But not in the absence of negli-
gence by the drawer. Graves v. American Bank (1858) 17 N. Y. 205. Similarly
in the case of a forged drawer's signature. Allen Gro. Co. v. Bank of Buchanan
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should fail after so doing, the drawer would have a complete interest in
the check.4 In such a case it seems proper to subrogate him to the
drawee's rights and allow him to recover under the accepted doctrine of
Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany.' But where the drawer has not been
and could not be charged with the check, it is difficult to discover a
property interest sufficient to enable him to trace the proceeds.0
(ii6) 192 Mo. 476, 182 S. W. 777. So, too, by the better rule, where the drawer
has been negligent in. leaving unfilled spaces. Young v. Grote (1827, C. P.) 4
Bing. 253; London Joint Stock Bank v. MacMillan [1918, H. L.] A. C. 777;
CoMtiMErrs (1917) 27 YAL LAW JouRNAL, 242, 269; (1919) 28 ibid. 414; (1923)
32 ibid. 413. As to when failure to make timely objections precludes the drawer
as against his drawee, see Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to
his Bank (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 598. The same negligence which
precludes recovery from the drawee might likewise prevent recovery from an
innocent purchaser for value. See Patton, op. cit. sufpra note i, sec. 1638.
'If the charge was improper, the drawer could have it cancelled and his deposit
correspondingly increased. But if he did this, he would have to share with the
general creditors in the distribution of the assets, and would have no interest in
the check. He could, however, ratify the payment; and then sue the collector.
'Supra note 2., In cases of alterations the drawer has been allowed to recover
from the one collecting the proceeds. Wagener v. Bank of LaGrande (1912) 63
Or. 299, 127 Pac. 778; cf. Fowler v. Bowery Savings Bank (1889) 113 N. Y.
450, 21 N. E. 172.
'National Bank v. Manufacturers' Bank (i89o) 122 N. Y. 367, 25 N. E. 355;
Davis v. Smith (1882) 29 Minn. 2Ol, 12 N. W. 531; Keene v. Collier (1858, Ky.)
i Met. 415.
